

(Revised Page 1 of Def. Doc. 2589, please attach)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: IWAKURO, Hideo

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I, IWAKURO, Hideo, live at No. 789, 2-Chome, DENENCHOFU, OTA-WARD, Tokyo Metropolis, and am aged 50.

My Career: I was appointed an infantry sub-lieutenant in December of the 7th year of TAISHO (1918); was appointed a staff officer of the Kwantung Army in July of the 7th year of SHOWA (1932); served at the Army General Staff Office from August of the 11th year of SHOWA (1936); was appointed the Chief of the Military Administration Section of the War Ministry in February of the 14th year of SHOWA (1939); and went over to America as the officer attached to the Military Affairs Bureau to assist Ambassador NOMURA. After returning to Japan in August of the same year, I served as the Commander of an infantry regiment and as the Chief of the IWAKURO Organ successively; was appointed Major General in March of the 18th year of SHOWA (1943) and then served as the Chief of the General Affairs Division of the Sumatra Military Administration Department and as the Chief of the Staff of the 28th Army successively. At the time of the termination of war, I was attached to the Army Munitions Department. As mentioned above, I held a post in the Military Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Bureau from August 1938 (the 13th year of SHOWA) to March 1941, so I have a fair knowledge of diplomatic matters, since external affairs as they affect the national defense are studied in this bureau.

2. The Army's opinion on the foreign policies came from the national defense plan, of which the General Staff was in charge. Besides, the General Staff had the duty to collect and examine military information and diplomatic information connected with it, and supervised military attaches. Accordingly, the Army's opinion on diplomatic policies used to be initiated by the General Staff. The Military Affairs Bureau was to report the matters transferred from the General Staff to the War Minister and to negotiate with the Foreign Ministry according to the War Minister's intention. On the other hand, when any matter was proposed by the Foreign Ministry to the Military Affairs Bureau, the Military Affairs Bureau, after transferring it to the General Staff to ask for its opinion, obtained the Minister's decision on it and made a reply to the Foreign Office. Such being the case, only a few officers served at the Military Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Bureau in considering diplomatic affairs as they affected national defense.

3. On the Tri-Partite Alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy. ---

- A. It was about August or September, 1938, when the proposed Japanese-German-Italian Tri-Partite Alliance was communicated to us from the Military Attaché to the Japanese Embassy at Berlin. The then KONOYE Cabinet resigned before formally taking up that question and thereafter the HIRANUMA Cabinet was formed.

I remember it was in the spring of 1939, soon after the formation of the HIRANUMA Cabinet, that the pros and cons of concluding the Tri-Partite Alliance were formally dealt with

- B. Those who advocated the Tri-Partite Alliance aimed at the immediate settlement of the China Incident. At that time, although Japan, impatient of the protracted China Incident, was eager for its prompt settlement by taking every possible means, it was observed that America, England and the Soviet Union, backing up China, were supporting China's persistent struggle; Japan, therefore, tried to expedite the solution of the Incident through the "good offices" of Germany. As regards the "good offices" of Germany, it was a fact that Japan requested the German Ambassador to China to mediate the peace negotiations between Japan and China in the autumn of the 12th year of SHOWA (1937), about the time of the occupation of Hanking, as we had an impression that Germany's voice toward China remained considerably strong.

- C. Before Japan and Germany came to an agreement on the pros and cons of concluding the Tri-Partite Alliance, the non-aggression pact between Germany and Russia was concluded unexpectedly in August, 1939 (the 14th year of SHOWA). As a result, the conclusion of the alliance did not come to be realized.

The main point as to the Tri-Partite Alliance on which Japan and Germany held different opinions was that, against Japan's intention of making the alliance a defensive one as to the Soviet Union, Germany tried to make it an offensive and defensive alliance against America and England.

- D. The conclusion of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact gave the Army as well as the people at home a strong impression that Japan had been betrayed by Germany. So far as we were concerned, accordingly, the impression among the military circles as well as the general public that Germany had betrayed us was due to the fact that we could not but doubt what Germany's true intention was when she concluded a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union as to whom Japan had desired protection through the Tri-Partite Alliance. In the statement made by the HIRANUMA Cabinet on its resignation, there were the words "intricate and enigmatic" which were also our honest feeling toward Germany's way of doing. Thus no one came to seriously expect the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Alliance.

- E. Soon after the second KONOYE Cabinet was formed in July 1940 (the 15th year of SHOWA), the Japanese-German-Italian Tri-Partite Alliance was concluded. It was generally said, however, to have been proposed by Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, the Military Affairs Bureau having nothing to do with it. Therefore, on being informed of the conclusion of the alliance, we in the War Ministry were surprised, as the conclusion of the pact was out of our consideration.
- F. On January 22, 1947, former Major General TANAKA Ryukichi testified that the Military Affairs Bureau sustained a consistent policy aiming at the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact and of construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere from the time of the ABE Cabinet. But the attitude of the Army as to the Tri-Partite Pact is as above described, and the testimony of Major General TANAKA is remarkably different from the fact. And it is also groundless to say that the military authorities had established a policy as to the construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

4. On the attitude of Director of the Military Affairs Bureau MUTO toward diplomatic problems. ---

- A. It was about the middle of October, 1939 (the 14th year of SHOWA) that Major General MUTO arrived at his post as the Director of the Military Affairs Bureau. I never heard from Director MUTO of the proposed Tri-Partite Alliance.

About the settlement of the China Incident, however, he frequently gave his views. As he had been on the China front for two years, he was well aware of the extreme difficulty of settling the China Incident. He believed that it was urgent for Japan to settle the China Incident, and that, for that purpose, we should not only directly deal with Chiang Kai-shek instead of taking such an attitude as saying "Japan will have nothing to do with Chiang Kai-shek", but also make the greatest concessions in the terms of negotiations, so as to bring about peace between the two nations. He further insisted on avoiding a dispute with any third power.

- B. When the German forces won a victory over the British Army in Dunkirk in May, 1940 (the 15th year of SHOWA), I discussed it with MUTO. He asserted himself, saying, "Generally speaking, many Japanese overestimate Germany's strength. Nevertheless, the German Army will never be able to invade Great Britain across the Straits of Dover. The English are sure to rally mentally and materially through the assistance of America. It is to be anticipated as a matter of course that this war will be protracted."



5. On the attitude of Director of the Military Affairs Bureau MUTO toward the Japanese-American negotiations. ---

- A. I went over to America in March, 1941 (the 16th year of SHOWA). It was because the Ambassador asked Vice-Minister of War ANAMI and Chief of the General Staff SUGIYAMA to send an assistant and, on the recommendation of Director MUTO, the Minister sent me.

My main duty was to assist Ambassador NOMURA at large. Prior to my visit to America, I made arrangements with IKAWA Tadao, with a view to restoring promptly the diplomatic relations between Japan and America. We proceeded with private negotiations on adjustment of the Japanese-American diplomatic relations with Maryknoll Bishop Walsh, Mr. Drought, Secretary-General of Maryknoll, and others in America. I, accordingly, prepared a programme of formalizing the negotiations between the two countries along this line. Prince KONOYE also expressed himself in favor of our negotiations. Mr. IKAWA and I, after going over to America, reported this plan to Ambassador NOMURA who readily agreed with us. So from then on the negotiations on adjusting the Japanese-American diplomatic relations were entered into in line with this plan.

On April 15, 1941, our tentative plan "Draft of the Understanding between Japan and America" was unofficially taken up by Ambassador NOMURA and Secretary of State Hull and was reported by telegram from the Embassy at Washington to the Foreign Ministry. At the same time, I wired War Minister TOJO urging him to give his support to our proposals. MUTO was very delighted at this and sent me a telegram of thanks.

Later, in August, 1941, I was ordered home and returned to Japan. After returning home, I was informed by Director of the Military Affairs Bureau MUTO that some of the staff of the Foreign Ministry were criticizing the presence of outsiders in connection with affairs of the Foreign Office, such as the efforts of Mr. IKAWA and myself in assisting Ambassador NOMURA, and that, accordingly, War Minister TOJO ordered me to return home in order to get rid of a possible obstacle to further negotiations.

I made a report to the top officials of the War Ministry after I returned home. I was glad to find my efforts being appreciated beyond my expectation. MUTO especially asked me in various ways about the forecast.

When I answered, saying, "According to my impression when I talked with Secretary of State Hull and Postmaster General Walker, there is a full possibility of bringing the negotiations to a success", he was very delighted.

- B. After that, I left the War Ministry to be appointed commander of an infantry regiment. My acquaintances in the Military Affairs Bureau and the General Staff Office informed me of the fact that MUTO had made an effort to the last to conclude the negotiations between Japan and America.

On this 2nd day of June, 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT IWAKURO Hideo (seal)

I, HARA Seiji, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At the same place

Witness: (signed) Hara Seiji (seal)

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ IWAKURO Hideo (seal)